CVE-2026-99280
ksmbd: drain session procfs readers before dropping table references
No known exploitation. No EPSS score yet. Fixed versions are out.
No public exploit knownFix1 product3 fixed builds listed below
No ready-made check. Neither Nuclei nor OpenVAS has one for this CVE yet.
What to do
Find your product and version, then upgrade to the build on the right.
- LinuxAffected: ≥ d7fd1f98607f2cd358e583f9548bdf0173090a86, < 6789f0983f8e85ce3a5ed8c50fc05d613ead9c2cUpgrade to: 6789f0983f8e85ce3a5ed8c50fc05d613ead9c2cAffected: ≥ d7fd1f98607f2cd358e583f9548bdf0173090a86, < 1c087cf7d5386c708d8984b263280b42b3daada0Upgrade to: 1c087cf7d5386c708d8984b263280b42b3daada0Affected: c99ea7855124ca1428a1e59c2b4590aaef34eacfUpgrade to: not statedAffected: ≥ 7.2.8, < 7.3Upgrade to: 7.3Stated by: CVE record
Versions as the sources state them. Full version matrix after sign-in
What it is
From the CVE record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: drain session procfs readers before dropping table references Session registration failure and connection cleanup can drop the table reference while the per-session procfs entry is still accessible. If a reader holds the last remaining reference, its final put calls proc_remove() from its own callback and waits for that callback to finish. Remove the procfs entry before dropping the table reference in the registration failure path. Queue sessions removed during connection cleanup and drain their procfs readers after releasing both session locks, then return their table references. Keep the global hash node unhashed while a session is queued so a concurrent unregister cannot drop the reference again. Previous-session replacement also destroys the file table before the session is finally freed. Detach the idr under the lock used by procfs file counters, and report zero files after it has been detached. This prevents a reader from accessing the idr during or after its destruction.
In plain language
No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.
Exploitation
Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.
- CISA KEV
Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.
- Public exploits
No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.
- EPSS
No EPSS score yet. New CVEs are usually scored within a few days.
Lifecycle
2 events over 0 days, from the signal feeds we watch.
- Publishedrecord updated
Affected products
Sources
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