CVE Tools

CVE-2026-98312

ALSA: 6fire: fix OOB write from device-reported iso length

No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 7th percentile. Fixed versions are out.

Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD

What to do

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  • LinuxAffected: ≥ c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9, < 61e665fb48e9eee44ec6d610514af383b1802cc1Upgrade to: 61e665fb48e9eee44ec6d610514af383b1802cc1Affected: ≥ c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9, < 246de677552fe5dede293a1543b632e9853f31e4Upgrade to: 246de677552fe5dede293a1543b632e9853f31e4Affected: ≥ c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9, < 001ba7c1d9677225a5ecbc3e60d4865c08bb21d8Upgrade to: 001ba7c1d9677225a5ecbc3e60d4865c08bb21d8Affected: ≥ c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9, < ea11ade10583cc45af515d6b24510dbfa0184ca6Upgrade to: ea11ade10583cc45af515d6b24510dbfa0184ca6 + 2 more branchesStated by: CVE record

Versions as the sources state them. Full version matrix after sign-in

What it is

From the CVE record

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: 6fire: fix OOB write from device-reported iso length usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler() sizes each outgoing isochronous packet as (actual_length - 4) / (in_n_analog << 2) * (out_n_analog << 2) + 4, where actual_length is the unsigned length the device reported for the matching IN packet. A packet completed with status 0 and actual_length < 4 wraps the subtraction to 0x7fffffec; a zero-length isochronous packet is legal on the bus, and the preceding loop rejects only non-zero status. The sum reaches memset() on out_urb->buffer, a 4832-byte object from kcalloc(PCM_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, PCM_N_PACKETS_PER_URB). Even without the wrap the result is out of bounds: at 88.2/96 kHz the 4-in/6-out scaling turns a full 420-byte IN packet into 628, so eight packets span 5024 bytes of that buffer. usb_submit_urb() rejects an over-long descriptor only after the memset() and the usb6fire_pcm_playback() copy of user PCM data have run. Guard the subtraction as the sibling usb6fire_pcm_capture() already does, and limit the frame count to what fits in rt->out_packet_size, the OUT endpoint's wMaxPacketSize. This bounds total_length by the buffer size while keeping each packet length aligned to a whole output frame. BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338) Write of size 18446744073709551456 at addr ffff88802a3d0000 by task vhci_rx/5018 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 mm/kasan/generic.c:200) __asan_memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84) usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657) usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741) vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:242) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Allocated by task 10: __kmalloc_cache_noprof (mm/slub.c:5563) usb6fire_pcm_init (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:560 sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:595) usb6fire_chip_probe (sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:133) usb_probe_interface (drivers/usb/core/driver.c:399) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802a3d0000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 4832-byte region [ffff88802a3d0000, ffff88802a3d12e0) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

In plain language

No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

EPSS7th
CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.

EPSS

0.2% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 7th percentile of scored CVEs.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.

Lifecycle

2 events over 0 days, from the signal feeds we watch.

  1. Publishedrecord updated

Affected products

Sources

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