CVE-2026-98180
drm/msm: RCU-free the scheduler-containing ring and VM objects
No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 2nd percentile. Fixed versions are out.
What to do
Find your product and version, then upgrade to the build on the right.
- LinuxAffected: ≥ 1d8a5ca436ee4a28eec14cb813f790f7cdeeee19, < d81bf4581903b0cba0698cd4d1c07fc6be21754aUpgrade to: d81bf4581903b0cba0698cd4d1c07fc6be21754aAffected: ≥ 1d8a5ca436ee4a28eec14cb813f790f7cdeeee19, < 713abac5c04ccbae67f9ac68c3921845535388e7Upgrade to: 713abac5c04ccbae67f9ac68c3921845535388e7Affected: ≥ 1d8a5ca436ee4a28eec14cb813f790f7cdeeee19, < 01c8d1f385f788f1bbbbb7687c4386d614281218Upgrade to: 01c8d1f385f788f1bbbbb7687c4386d614281218Stated by: CVE record
Versions as the sources state them. Full version matrix after sign-in
What it is
From the CVE record
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm: RCU-free the scheduler-containing ring and VM objects Both struct msm_ringbuffer and struct msm_gem_vm embed a struct drm_gpu_scheduler. msm_ringbuffer_destroy() and the VM free callback msm_gem_vm_free() call drm_sched_fini() on the embedded scheduler and then free the containing object with plain kfree(). drm_sched_fence_get_timeline_name() returns fence->sched->name, and the scheduler fence keeps a .release callback so it is not ops-detached on signalling. A finished fence exported to userspace (the submit out-fence, or a VM_BIND fence, via sync_file / drm_syncobj) keeps pointing at the embedded scheduler after the ring/VM is freed, so a later get_timeline_name() -- reachable unprivileged through SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO -- dereferences freed slab memory (KASAN slab-use-after-free read). Per the dma-fence lifetime contract the exporter must keep the data backing a signalled fence alive for an RCU grace period. Free the scheduler-containing objects with kfree_rcu() instead of kfree(). Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/750234/
In plain language
No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.
Exploitation
Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.
- CISA KEV
Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.
- Public exploits
No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.
- EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 2nd percentile of scored CVEs.
Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.
Lifecycle
3 events over 1 day, from the signal feeds we watch.
- Record updated
- Publishedrecord updated
Affected products
Technical detail
CVSS 3.1 vector
Open in the CVSS calculatorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Scored 7.1 by NVD.
How it is reached
- Attack Vector LocalRequires local access to the vulnerable system (e.g. local login, malicious file)
- Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
- Privileges Required LowRequires basic user-level privileges
- User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation
Scope
- Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself
Impact if exploited
- Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
- Integrity NoneNo integrity impact
- Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable
Sources
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