CVE Tools

CVE-2026-95823

Use-after-free and net_buf leak in Zephyr TCP header linearization (tcp_pkt_linearize)

No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 31st percentile. Fixed versions are out.

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Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD

What to do

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  • Zephyrproject ZephyrAffected: ≥ 2.3.0, < 4.3.2Upgrade to: 4.3.2Affected: ≥ 4.4.0, < 4.5.0Upgrade to: 4.5.0Stated by: CVE record

Versions as the sources state them. Full version matrix after sign-in

What it is

From the CVE record

tcp_pkt_linearize() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c is used by th_get() whenever a received TCP header is not contiguous in a single net_buf. While pulling the header bytes out of the following fragments, the loop called net_buf_unref() on an emptied fragment without first detaching its frags pointer. net_buf_unref() walks the whole fragment list, so the payload buffers still linked behind that fragment were freed as well, and the stale pointer was then reinstalled into the packet as buf->frags, producing a use-after-free and a later double free during packet teardown. The same loop also advanced to second->frags unconditionally: when the fragment still held payload after the header remainder was pulled, it was spliced out of the packet without ever being unreferenced, permanently leaking that buffer and silently dropping the data it carried. The defect is reached from tcp_recv() via th_get() on every received TCP segment, before connection lookup or any header validation, so a single unauthenticated segment that matches a listening socket is sufficient. An attacker only needs the TCP header to straddle a net_buf boundary, which they can arrange from off-link: IPv6 extension headers are accepted on receive and their length is added to the header offset by th_get(), so a Destination Options header of a suitable length places the TCP header across the boundary of the fixed-size receive buffers (CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE). Packet chains assembled from several sources - IPv4/IPv6 reassembly, 6LoWPAN/802.15.4 reassembly, tunnel or virtual interfaces that strip an outer header, or drivers producing scatter-gather chains - can additionally present a short interior fragment that the loop empties exactly, which is the case that frees the remainder of the packet while it is still in use. The reliably reachable consequence is exhaustion of the receive buffer pool: each crafted segment leaks one net_buf from the fixed CONFIG_NET_BUF_RX_COUNT pool, the buffers are never reclaimed, and once the pool is empty the device can no longer receive network traffic until it is rebooted. Where a fragment is emptied exactly, the impact rises to memory corruption: freed pool buffers are written through by the remainder of the loop, their contents may be delivered to the application, and the packet is double-freed on teardown. The fix saves and clears second->frags before the net_buf_unref() so only the emptied header fragment is released, and advances to the next fragment only when second->len == 0, keeping any fragment that still holds payload in the packet. This restores the detach-before-unref ownership pattern used elsewhere in the stack, for example in net_pkt_trim_buffer().

In plain language

No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

EPSS31st
CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.

EPSS

0.4% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 31st percentile of scored CVEs.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.

Lifecycle

5 events over 0 days, from the signal feeds we watch.

  1. Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped, record updated, record updated

Affected products

Technical detail

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Scored 7.5 by NVD.

How it is reached

  • Attack Vector NetworkExploitable remotely over the network without any special conditions
  • Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
  • Privileges Required NoneNo authentication required — anyone can exploit this
  • User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation

Scope

  • Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself

Impact if exploited

  • Confidentiality NoneNo confidentiality impact
  • Integrity NoneNo integrity impact
  • Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable

Weaknesses

ATT&CK techniques

Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.

Sources

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