CVE Tools

CVE-2026-91007

Arbitrary supervisor-mode function pointer injection via charger_set_prop() syscall in the charger driver API

No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 1st percentile. Fixed versions are out.

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Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD

What to do

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  • Zephyrproject ZephyrAffected: ≥ 3.7.0, < 4.3.2Upgrade to: 4.3.2Affected: ≥ 4.4.0, < 4.5.0Upgrade to: 4.5.0Stated by: CVE record

Versions as the sources state them. Full version matrix after sign-in

What it is

From the CVE record

The user-mode syscall verifiers for the charger driver API in drivers/charger/charger_handlers.c did not inspect the prop argument before copying union charger_propval across the user/kernel boundary. Two members of that union are function pointers — status_notification (CHARGER_PROP_STATUS_NOTIFICATION) and online_notification (CHARGER_PROP_ONLINE_NOTIFICATION), declared in include/zephyr/drivers/charger.h — and z_vrfy_charger_set_prop() forwarded the caller-supplied union verbatim to the driver's set_property callback for any property. z_vrfy_charger_get_prop() had the mirror defect and copied the stored kernel callback address back out to user memory. With CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, any user-mode thread that has been granted a charger device object could call charger_set_prop() with CHARGER_PROP_STATUS_NOTIFICATION or CHARGER_PROP_ONLINE_NOTIFICATION and an arbitrary pointer value. Drivers that implement these properties — drivers/charger/charger_max20335.c, drivers/charger/charger_pf1550.c and drivers/charger/charger_bq2518x.c — store the pointer in device data and later invoke it from their interrupt work handlers, which run in supervisor mode, on any charger state change such as a cable plug/unplug. The result is a control-flow hijack at kernel privilege from an unprivileged thread, defeating the isolation that CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to provide; the read path additionally disclosed a kernel code address to user mode, and clearing a notifier installed by a supervisor thread let user mode suppress charger notifications. Supervisor-mode callers of charger_set_prop()/charger_get_prop() are unaffected. The fix makes both verifiers reject the two notifier properties outright — including when the supplied callback is NULL, since the notifiers are device state — and adds a BUILD_ASSERT on CHARGER_PROP_COMMON_COUNT so that new properties force a re-review of the union's user-mode safety.

In plain language

No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

EPSS1st
CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.

EPSS

0.1% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 1st percentile of scored CVEs.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.

Lifecycle

4 events over 5 days, from the signal feeds we watch.

  1. Record updated
  2. Publishedweakness classified, record updated

Affected products

Technical detail

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Scored 7.8 by NVD.

How it is reached

  • Attack Vector LocalRequires local access to the vulnerable system (e.g. local login, malicious file)
  • Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
  • Privileges Required LowRequires basic user-level privileges
  • User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation

Scope

  • Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself

Impact if exploited

  • Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
  • Integrity HighTotal loss of integrity — attacker can modify any data in the component
  • Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable

Weaknesses

Sources

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