CVE Tools

CVE-2026-90834

UART wide-data syscall verifiers check the 8-bit driver op, allowing a user-mode thread to trigger a NULL function-pointer call in kernel mode

No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 4th percentile. Fixed versions are out.

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Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD

What to do

Find your product and version, then upgrade to the build on the right.

  • Zephyrproject ZephyrAffected: ≥ 3.0.0, < 4.3.2Upgrade to: 4.3.2Affected: ≥ 4.4.0, < 4.5.0Upgrade to: 4.5.0Stated by: CVE record

Versions as the sources state them. Full version matrix after sign-in

What it is

From the CVE record

The user-mode syscall verifiers for the 16-bit ("wide data") UART API in drivers/serial/uart_handlers.c validated the wrong driver operation. z_vrfy_uart_poll_out_u16(), z_vrfy_uart_tx_u16() and z_vrfy_uart_rx_enable_u16() each ran K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_UART() against the 8-bit op (poll_out, tx, rx_enable) rather than the 16-bit op that the corresponding implementation dereferences (poll_out_u16, tx_u16, rx_enable_u16). z_impl_uart_poll_out_u16(), z_impl_uart_tx_u16() and z_impl_uart_rx_enable_u16() in include/zephyr/drivers/uart/uart_internal.h call their op unconditionally, with no NULL guard of their own, because the verifier is supposed to have established that the op exists. CONFIG_UART_WIDE_DATA is an application-selectable option that no driver selects, and only a handful of the serial drivers in the tree implement any _u16 operation; every other driver leaves those struct uart_driver_api members NULL while still providing the 8-bit ops the old check inspected. In a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_UART_WIDE_DATA (plus CONFIG_UART_ASYNC_API for the uart_tx_u16() and uart_rx_enable_u16() variants), an unprivileged user-mode thread that legitimately holds access to such a UART device object can invoke the _u16 syscall: the object, permission and op checks all pass, and the kernel-side implementation then performs an indirect call through a NULL function pointer while running at supervisor privilege. The result is a CPU exception taken in kernel context instead of the intended K_OOPS or -ENOSYS return. With the default k_sys_fatal_error_handler() this halts the system (or warm-reboots it under CONFIG_RESET_ON_FATAL_ERROR), so a thread confined by the userspace sandbox can deny service to the whole device — a capability the user-mode privilege boundary is specifically meant to withhold. The call target is a fixed NULL, so there is no attacker-controlled code execution and no memory disclosure; the separate K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_ARRAY_READ()/K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_ARRAY_WRITE() bounds checks on the caller's buffer were and remain correct. The fix points each verifier at the matching _u16 op, using a plain K_SYSCALL_OBJ() object check where the op does not exist or where the implementation already tests it for NULL.

In plain language

No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

EPSS4th
CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.

EPSS

0.1% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 4th percentile of scored CVEs.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.

Lifecycle

5 events over 3 days, from the signal feeds we watch.

  1. Record updated
  2. Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped, record updated

Affected products

Technical detail

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Scored 5.5 by NVD.

How it is reached

  • Attack Vector LocalRequires local access to the vulnerable system (e.g. local login, malicious file)
  • Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
  • Privileges Required LowRequires basic user-level privileges
  • User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation

Scope

  • Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself

Impact if exploited

  • Confidentiality NoneNo confidentiality impact
  • Integrity NoneNo integrity impact
  • Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable

Weaknesses

ATT&CK techniques

Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.

Sources

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