CVE-2026-84782
DTLS Retransmits Handshake Messages From a Stale Buffer Offset
No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 31st percentile. Fixed versions are out.
What to do
Find your product and version, then upgrade to the build on the right.
- OpenSSLAffected: ≥ 4.0.0, < 4.0.3Upgrade to: 4.0.3Affected: ≥ 3.6.0, < 3.6.5Upgrade to: 3.6.5Affected: ≥ 3.5.0, < 3.5.9Upgrade to: 3.5.9Affected: ≥ 3.4.0, < 3.4.8Upgrade to: 3.4.8 + 3 more branchesStated by: CVE record
Versions as the sources state them. Full version matrix after sign-in
Coverage timeline
2 publishersVendor patch released
Sourced from public security reporting — each date is when it was published, not when it happened. 1 further article named this CVE in wider roundups without reporting it as a distinct event.
What it is
From the CVE record
Issue summary: The DTLS retransmission logic does not correctly handle a handshake message write that is suspended part-way through. The retransmitted message can be read past the message buffer and the retransmission overwrites the internal state the suspended write needs to resume correctly. Impact summary: The retransmitted message can disclose a heap memory to the peer as plaintext handshake data or cause a crash and a Denial of Service when the read reaches an unmapped memory region. CWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read Description: DTLS handshake messages can be written out in multiple fragments, and a write can suspend mid-message (returning WANT_WRITE) if the underlying transport temporarily cannot accept more data. While such a write is suspended, the DTLS retransmission timer may independently fire and ask the retransmission logic to resend an earlier, already-acknowledged-as-sent message from its retransmit queue. The retransmission logic reused the same internal buffer and position tracking as the message that was still being written, without resetting the position back to the start of the message being retransmitted. As a result the retransmission was read starting from wherever the suspended write had left off, producing a mislabelled message whose body was leftover bytes from the other, larger message still in flight - content that was never meant to be sent at that point, and which could run past the end of the allocated buffer. Separately, even when the retransmission is positioned correctly, allowing it to run to completion while another write is suspended overwrites the same shared bookkeeping that the suspended write depends on to resume. When the application later resumes the suspended write (via a subsequent SSL_read(), SSL_write(), SSL_accept(), or SSL_connect() call), it finds that bookkeeping in a state inconsistent with the message and aborts the process in a debugging build. The fix resets the retransmission's read position to the start of the message before resending, and skips retransmission entirely whenever a handshake write is still suspended, deferring to the next call that resumes it instead. FIPS impact: no The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.
In plain language
No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.
Exploitation
Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.
- CISA KEV
Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.
- Public exploits
No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.
- EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 31st percentile of scored CVEs.
Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.
Lifecycle
7 events over 9 days, from the signal feeds we watch.
- Patch availablerecord updated
- Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped, record updated, record updated
Affected products
And 1 more affected product. See all after sign-in
Technical detail
CVSS 3.1 vector
Open in the CVSS calculatorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
Scored 8.2 by NVD.
How it is reached
- Attack Vector NetworkExploitable remotely over the network without any special conditions
- Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
- Privileges Required NoneNo authentication required — anyone can exploit this
- User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation
Scope
- Scope UnchangedImpact is limited to the vulnerable component itself
Impact if exploited
- Confidentiality LowSome restricted information is disclosed, but limited in scope
- Integrity NoneNo integrity impact
- Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable
Weaknesses
ATT&CK techniques
Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.
Sources
References in the record
- github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/906cf0ef1c85ca40ce69163e9086d6d3fe292943
- github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9f6b34422af7eb5dac61322e33dac1ae989fa628
- github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a383dafdd754eb5b22bf45e37e1bff9d07277a58
And 2 more references. See all after sign-in
In the news
Watch the software you run.
My Stack ranks new CVEs for your products by real-world exploitation, so the next serious one reaches you without reading every advisory.
We'll flag the next CVE, public exploit or patch for OpenSSL, not every advisory.
A free account adds
- The full version matrix and every affected product
- Exploit links, proofs of concept and Metasploit modules
- Email alerts for the products you watch
- The same data over REST API, MCP and CLI