free5GC: NEF nnef-pfdmanagement API is unauthenticated; forged bearer tokens can read PFD data and create/delete PFD subscriptions
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC's NEF mounts the nnef-pfdmanagement route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can use a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token) to read PFD application data via GET /applications and GET /applications/{appID}, and to create or delete PFD change-notification subscriptions via POST /subscriptions and DELETE /subscriptions/{subID}. Same root cause as the other NEF SBI findings: the route group is mounted without any inbound auth middleware. Unlike the OAM and traffic-influence groups, nnef-pfdmanagement IS declared in the runtime ServiceList, so this is the production-intended path that operators expect to be protected by OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true -- and it is not. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.
AV:NAttack VectorAC:LAttack ComplexityPR:NPrivileges RequiredUI:NUser InteractionS:CScopeC:LConfidentialityI:HIntegrityA:HAvailabilityClick technique nodes to view MITRE ATT&CK details. Scroll to zoom, drag to pan.
Get the full picture for CVE-2026-44330 and every CVE in our database. Create a free account — no credit card required.
Create Free Account