CVE Tools

CVE-2026-105697

Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration

No known exploitation. EPSS puts it in the 40th percentile. No fix published yet.

Published Updated Sources: CVE.org, NVD

What to do

No fixed build or workaround is published yet. Limit exposure and watch for a patch.

  • Langflow-ai LangflowAffected: >= 1.1.2, < 1.10.3Upgrade to: not statedStated by: CVE record
  • Langflow-ai Langflow-baseAffected: >= 0.1.2, < 0.10.3Upgrade to: not statedStated by: CVE record
  • Langflow-ai LfxAffected: < 1.10.3Upgrade to: not statedStated by: CVE record

Versions as the sources state them. Full version matrix after sign-in

What it is

From the CVE record

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Before Langflow 1.10.3, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever command / args a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in bash -c "exec {command} ...". Any user able to reach the MCP server settings ("Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server", POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a "server" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (touch, rm -rf, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start. With the default LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true, GET /api/v1/auto_login hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. AUTO_LOGIN is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it. This issue is fixed in Langflow 1.10.3, langflow-base 0.10.3, and lfx 1.10.3.

In plain language

No plain-language summary for this CVE yet.

Exploitation

Where each signal puts this CVE on the scale from published to confirmed exploited.

EPSS40th
CISA KEV

Not in the catalog. CISA has not confirmed exploitation.

Public exploits

No public exploit or proof of concept found in the sources we track.

EPSS

0.5% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, which ranks it in the 40th percentile of scored CVEs.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System, FIRST.org. A probability, not a confirmation.

Lifecycle

6 events over 4 days, from the signal feeds we watch.

  1. Record updated
  2. Record updated
  3. Publishedweakness classified, att&ck mapped, record updated

Affected products

Technical detail

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Scored 9.9 by NVD.

How it is reached

  • Attack Vector NetworkExploitable remotely over the network without any special conditions
  • Attack Complexity LowNo special conditions — the attack can be reliably reproduced
  • Privileges Required LowRequires basic user-level privileges
  • User Interaction NoneNo user interaction needed — fully automated exploitation

Scope

  • Scope ChangedThe exploit can affect other components (e.g. sandbox escape, host compromise from VM)

Impact if exploited

  • Confidentiality HighTotal information disclosure — all data in the component is compromised
  • Integrity HighTotal loss of integrity — attacker can modify any data in the component
  • Availability HighTotal denial of service — the component is completely unavailable

Weaknesses

ATT&CK techniques

Mapped from the weaknesses above (CWE to ATT&CK), not observed in attacks.

Sources

Watch the software you run.

My Stack ranks new CVEs for your products by real-world exploitation, so the next serious one reaches you without reading every advisory.

We'll flag the next CVE, public exploit or patch for Langflow, not every advisory.