CVE-2026-93355: Account Takeover in LiteLLM
PoC publicLiteLLMOur summary
Security researchers at OX disclosed CVE-2026-93355, an authentication bypass in the open-source LLM gateway LiteLLM that lets an attacker take over any existing user's account, including a proxy_admin, with a single forged request. The flaw stems from LiteLLM's JWT handling: when a token's user_id or sso_user_id doesn't directly match an account, the proxy falls back to matching on the token's email claim without ever checking whether that email has actually been verified. Worse, a successful match not only grants the attacker the victim's session but silently and permanently rewrites the victim's sso_user_id to the attacker's token subject, turning a one-time forged claim into lasting access to every API key, budget, and admin function behind the proxy. Rated CVSS 8.8, the issue affects all versions up to 1.100.1 and remains unpatched as of this disclosure despite being reported to the vendor back in May 2026; a working proof of concept is now public, so administrators are urged to enforce verified-email claims and pin identity to stable subject IDs as interim mitigations.
Below is the opening; the full story is at OX Security.
From OX Security
One request carrying an unverified email claim grants immediate access as the victim and permanently mutates account
TLDR
What: OX Research found a way to use a legitimately signed login token to authenticate as another existing LiteLLM user, including an admin .LiteLLM is an open-source gateway used by companies to manage access to OpenAI, Anthropic, and other LLM APIs. It holds API keys, tracks spend, and controls who can access what.
How: LiteLLM’s JWT authentication silently falls back to an unverified email claim when a direct identity match misses. This lets an attacker log in as any victim, including a proxy_admin, and permanently rebind that victim’s SSO account to the attacker’s own token with a single request. No victim interaction or prior credentials are required.…
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