CVE Tools
A server rack in a dim data center with a single blinking status light on a network switch, suggesting an unattended SSH port quietly accepting a connection

CVE-2026-123158: OpenSSH's musl Password Bypass Is in CISA's KEV — and the Patch Deadline Already Passed

Any password between 257 and 1024 bytes could log into an account that had none, because of how musl's crypt() and OpenSSH's salt-borrowing logic interact. GreyNoise confirmed root compromises within about 40 hours of disclosure.

8.1CVSS v3.1 scoreHIGH — AC:H, despite exploitation being a single request
KEVCISA Known Exploited VulnerabilitiesAdded 2026-11-09, deadline 2026-11-12 — already passed
97.3rd pctEPSS percentileRaw score 18.9% — the percentile is what stands out, not the score
~40 hrsTime to first confirmed root compromiseGreyNoise honeypot telemetry, after public disclosure
42Confirmed post-exploitation eventsFrom 10 distinct attacker IPs, per GreyNoise
0Public detection rules foundNo Sigma/Suricata/Nuclei rule located as of publication

Overview

CVE-2026-123158 is an authentication bypass in sshd, the server component of OpenSSH, on Linux systems built against musl libc — Alpine Linux's default C library — without PAM. The CVE record describes it as a bug "related to misinterpretation of whether a string is intended to be a password hash": for some account configurations, any password between 256 and 1024 characters succeeds, regardless of the account's real password. OpenBSD shipped the fix, OpenSSH 10.6p2, on November 5, 2026; Alpine shipped a patched package the same day.

  • Advisory date: November 5, 2026 (OpenSSH 10.6p2 release and Alpine Linux advisory)
  • CVSS: 8.1 HIGH — AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • CWE-394: Unexpected Status Code or Return Value
  • KEV status: added November 9, 2026; federal remediation deadline November 12, 2026 — already passed
  • Affected: OpenSSH before 10.6p2, on Linux, built against musl libc, with PAM disabled (UsePAM no, or a non-PAM build) and PasswordAuthentication yes
Alpine branchFixed openssh packageFixed release bundle
edge10.6_p2-r0—
3.2410.3_p1-r23.24.4
3.2310.2_p1-r13.23.8
3.2210.0_p1-r113.22.8
3.219.9_p2-r13.21.10
3.16 – 3.20 (unsupported)various backports, 9.0–9.7not bundled — move to a supported branch

How a C library error code became a password

The chain starts in musl, not in OpenSSH. musl's crypt() function returns the literal string "" as an error indicator whenever the key it's given is longer than 256 bytes. Separately, every Linux account with no password set also stores "" in its /etc/shadow password field — the standard convention for "no password, can't log in this way." sshd's non-PAM authentication path needs a real salt to run crypt() against in the first place, so for an account whose own field is too short to contain one, it borrows the salt from any other account on the system that does have a real $5$/$6$ hash. Send a password between 257 and 1024 bytes to the passwordless account, and crypt() returns "" — which matches the "" already stored there. Alpine's own summary of the bug: "One user with a password is enough: it makes every account without one reachable."

Why an oversized password passes sshd's check

  1. Attacker sends a 257–1024 byte password — Target: an account with no password set — shadow field "*" — e.g. a key-only user
  2. sshd borrows a salt — Non-PAM sshd needs a real $5$/$6$ salt to run crypt() — it borrows one from any other account on the system that has a real password hash
  3. musl crypt() rejects the oversized key — musl's crypt() returns the literal string "*" as its own error indicator for any key over 256 bytes
  4. "*" equals "*" — The borrowed-salt crypt() output matches the stored "*" password field exactly
  5. Login succeeds — sshd grants access to the passwordless account — no real password was ever set or needed

A fix with no embargo window

Most CVEs get weeks of private coordination before anyone outside the vendor and reporter knows a bug exists. This one barely got a day.

CVE-2026-123158's first week

  1. Fix committed to openssh-portable
    Patch commit 4353fdc, per GreyNoise's published timeline of the disclosure.
  2. Public disclosure
    OpenSSH 10.6p2 released within a minute of the fix going public, per GreyNoise. Alpine Linux published its own advisory and patched packages the same day.
  3. CVE-2026-123158 published
    NVD/CVE.org record published at 15:46:26 UTC, CVSS 8.1. A public exploit reportedly appeared roughly 2.5 hours before the CVE ID itself was reserved, per GreyNoise.
  4. First confirmed root compromise
    GreyNoise recorded successful exploitation on a honeypot running real Alpine Linux and OpenSSH — about 40 hours after public disclosure.
  5. Added to CISA KEV
    Catalogued as an authentication-bypass vulnerability; federal civilian agencies given until 2026-11-12 to remediate under BOD 26-04.
  6. KEV deadline passed
    The three-day federal remediation window closed. We found no amendment to the KEV entry extending it.
We consider the root cause of this bug to be outside sshd, but it is exploitable via sshd and can be avoided there.
— OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes — openssh.org

OpenSSH maintainer Damien Miller explained the unusually fast, nearly embargo-free turnaround in a mailing-list post the same day: the project now treats long private-disclosure windows as a risk in their own right, citing a trend of "rapid bug rediscovery by AI agents, sometimes within hours" as a reason delay increasingly helps attackers more than defenders. The report was credited to a researcher at Wakefield (wakefield.co), with the mailing list noting the same vulnerability "does not exist on non-Linux systems, Linux/glibc systems, and Linux systems that use PAM for password authentication."

What actually happened on the internet

GreyNoise has tracked scanning and exploitation traffic for this CVE since public disclosure. The overwhelming majority is noise — mass TCP/22 scanning that never gets near the actual bug — but a small number of connections turned into confirmed, logged intrusions. Weighed against the broader internet exposure picture we track, this is a case where raw scan volume was a terrible predictor of real compromise.

StageCountShare of prior stage
TCP/22 SYN scans66,000,000—
Full TCP connections48,400,00073%
Attempted SSH logins47,500,00098%
Possible exploitation attempts5<0.01%
Confirmed post-exploitation activity42 events / 10 attacker IPs—

GreyNoise groups part of that activity under an internal cluster label, "GreyNoise Threat 10" (GT10) — seven of the ten attacker IPs reusing infrastructure across intrusions. Victim systems GreyNoise observed span New Zealand, Laos, Australia, India, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and France. Attacker-side infrastructure includes addresses registered to Vodafone in Egypt, DIGI Spain Telecom, two separate Indonesian networks, Oracle Corporation in Singapore, and China Mobile. GreyNoise's tracker lists 520 indicators tied to confirmed exploitation and 123 files created or modified on victim systems; among its named examples, one Vodafone-Egypt address alone ran five separate intrusions totaling 132 shell sessions and 235 commands.

What the score says vs. what happened

The CVSS vector
  • Attack Complexity: High (AC:H)
  • Requires musl libc + PAM disabled + a second account with a real password hash on the box
  • Privileges required: None · User interaction: None
  • Base score 8.1 — High, one notch below Critical
CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
What GreyNoise observed
  • Alpine's own advisory: "one connection, works every time, and needs no retries"
  • Two public PoC repos on GitHub, tagged Exploit by NVD's own reference list
  • First confirmed root compromise ~40 hours after disclosure
  • 42 confirmed intrusions across 10 IPs inside the first week
GreyNoise CVE-2026-123158 tracker

Mitigation guidance

  • Upgrade OpenSSH to 10.6p2 or later, or your distro's backported equivalent — see the Alpine table above for exact package versions.
  • Restart sshd after upgrading. On Alpine, "apk upgrade -U -a" alone does not replace the running daemon; the old, vulnerable process keeps serving connections until it's restarted.
  • If you can't patch immediately, set "PasswordAuthentication no" and restart sshd. Systems that already disable password auth, or that run PAM with "UsePAM yes", are not affected by this specific bug.
  • Audit for prior compromise: check /var/log/messages (or your syslog equivalent) for "Accepted password for" entries against accounts that were never supposed to have one.
  • Cloud-init-provisioned images that already set PasswordAuthentication no by default are not affected, per Alpine's advisory — verify that setting rather than assuming it.

Updates

2026-11-13 — The CISA KEV deadline of November 12 has passed. We found no amendment to the KEV entry extending it, and no indication CISA has removed or downgraded it. If that changes, we'll update this section rather than publish a new article.

Does this affect regular Ubuntu, Debian, or RHEL servers?
Only if they're built against musl libc instead of glibc, which is unusual outside Alpine Linux and some embedded or container base images. OpenSSH's own mailing-list advisory states the bug "does not exist on... Linux/glibc systems," so a standard glibc-based distro like Ubuntu, Debian or RHEL is not affected by this specific bug.
Is Alpine's default cloud image vulnerable out of the box?
Not by itself. The default "alpine" cloud-image account has passwordless doas but no second account's password hash on the box for sshd to borrow a salt from. It becomes exploitable as soon as any account on that system gets a real password — including one set manually for console access.
Do I need PAM enabled to be safe?
Systems using PAM for password authentication with "UsePAM yes" are not affected by this specific bug, per OpenSSH's own advisory. That's distinct from simply "running OpenSSH" — it's the non-PAM authentication path that's exploitable.
Has this been confirmed exploited, or just scanned for?
Both, and they're very different in scale. GreyNoise logged tens of millions of scanning connections but only 42 confirmed post-exploitation events from 10 attacker IPs as of its last update — a tiny fraction of the scanning volume, but real, logged root compromises, not hypothetical risk.

Data as of 2026-11-13live record →

Sources: OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes, Alpine Linux security advisory, openssh-unix-dev mailing list, Damien Miller, Nov 5 2026, CVE.org record, NVD entry, CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, GreyNoise CVE-2026-123158 tracker.